Iran’s policy of strategic patience
Al Mada, Iraq, October 9
In a telling shift from its longstanding policy of “strategic patience,” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s appearance during the Friday prayer sermon in Tehran, with a rifle prominently displayed beside him, signals Iran’s readiness to pivot toward a more aggressive posture. This move comes in the wake of the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah – a seismic event that appears to have propelled Iran into an escalating conflict with Israel.
Hezbollah, traditionally at the forefront of the confrontation in southern Lebanon with Iranian backing, faces a landscape now devoid of specific engagement rules, as confrontation burgeons amid a waning deterrent equilibrium. Nasrallah’s death has recalibrated the dynamics, compelling Tehran into the vortex of direct conflict with Israel, a scenario meticulously orchestrated by the Netanyahu government in Tel Aviv.
Since Oct. 7, 2023, Tehran’s stance had been one of restraint, keen to avoid a broader regional conflagration. Even following its missile response to the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus last April, Iran and its officials staunchly maintained their preference to avert war. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized efforts to prevent conflict expansion. Araghchi, responding to inquiries in a New York press briefing, underlined Hezbollah’s autonomy, asserting its capability to defend Lebanon independently.
Yet, Nasrallah’s assassination marked a decisive rhetorical and operational shift, evidenced by Iran’s launch of missiles toward Israel. Aware of the risks inherent in direct military engagement with Israel, Iran is nonetheless shedding its previous strategy of patience and meticulous diplomacy in favor of more direct measures.
Tehran’s involvement sends a clear signal – a response to the targeted assassinations not only of Nasrallah but also of other figures such as Ismail Haniyeh and Iranian leaders in Lebanon and Syria. Tehran understands that Netanyahu’s ambitions extend beyond Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, aiming to transform the Middle East with military might. Iran stands resolute, countering Israeli strategies not through conventional warfare, but by empowering its regional proxies. Israel’s response to Iranian aggression might briefly recalibrate deterrence, despite Iran’s ominous warnings to target Israeli refineries and gas fields if provoked.
Neither side desires expansive warfare, favoring instead localized skirmishes involving Iran’s regional affiliates. Iran now faces a strategic crossroads, vacillating between relinquishing its erstwhile patience, confronting constrained losses by risking its axis of resistance or accepting the weakening of its proxies.
Hezbollah stands as the linchpin of Iran’s regional strategy, yet now battles alone under the specter of Israeli assassination campaigns. The Houthis in Yemen threaten Red Sea commercial routes, though they have yet to effectively launch a military front against Israel. Similarly, factions in Iraq remain poised but have refrained from opening substantial new fronts. The Coordinating Committee of the Iraqi Resistance Factions wavers on the precipice, yet refrains from full-scale war, maintaining readiness without committing to direct conflict.
The strategic divergence between Tehran and Tel Aviv is stark: Iran seeks to defend its regional influence, accumulated painstakingly over two decades, while exercising measured force. This sentiment was encapsulated in Khamenei’s sermon, where he articulated a resolve intertwined with caution, signaling readiness to act when deemed prudent.
Conversely, Israel pursues a recalibration of regional reality, grounded in securing borders and reinstating deterrence, using its military prowess and intelligence edge. It leverages the US electoral interlude, capitalizing on Washington’s diminished Middle Eastern engagement, barring isolated pro-Israel interventions, to cement a new status quo.
Israel’s current strategy appears to be a race against time until November 5, coinciding with the US presidential elections, striving to forge an Israeli-centric Middle East not through diplomacy but through bloodshed, missiles, and target eliminations. – Ayad Al-Anbar
When will inevitable Israel-Iran clash unfold?
Al Rai, Kuwait, October 8
Israel has managed to turn a portion of Lebanon into another Gaza. Previously, we were concerned with Gaza; now, our attention extends to both Gaza and Lebanon. This is the reality we must confront one year after the onset of the Gaza conflict, when Hamas, under the leadership of Yahya Sinwar, initiated the Al-Aqsa Flood attack that significantly shook the Israeli state, propelling it into an existential crisis.
The future of the region is now undeniably being reshaped by new developments stemming from the Gaza events of Oct. 7, 2023. Unwittingly, Sinwar has taken on the role of shaping the region’s future. As he ascended to head Hamas’s political bureau following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Sinwar continues to navigate Gaza’s tunnels with Israeli hostages in tow, despite the fact that the densely populated Strip of 365 sq.k. has become a place that even its residents find inhospitable.
Who holds accountability for this situation? Certainly, it is shared at the Lebanese level, particularly by Hezbollah, which chose to confront Israel by opening a front in southern Lebanon. Lebanon is now experiencing the consequences of the seeds sown by Hezbollah. Hezbollah and Iran, backing its actions, miscalculated Israel severely.
Above all, it is evident that Hezbollah underestimated the duration of the Gaza conflict. They believed history would repeat itself, as it did in the summer of 2006, when international forces, led by the United States, acted swiftly to halt the conflict after only 33 days. In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1701. Hezbollah was quick to embrace the resolution, with its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who was recently assassinated by Israeli forces in the southern suburbs of Beirut, seizing the moment to declare a “divine victory.”
This so-called victory was, in truth, a triumph over Lebanon itself, allowing the party to consolidate control gradually until it succeeded in installing Michel Aoun as president of the republic on October 31, 2016, subsequently gaining control over decisions of war and peace.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not eliminate Hamas. Instead, he chose to devastate Gaza, with no assurance that it would recuperate anytime soon. International organizations suggest that Gaza may need 20 years to rebuild. How could a Lebanese party overlook Israel’s reaction to the Al-Aqsa Flood and impulsively declare war on Israel the very next day under the guise of “supporting Gaza”?
In light of the widespread devastation in southern Lebanese villages and the displacement of 1.5 million Lebanese citizens, the pressing question remains: IS there a possibility of halting the war that Israel is waging on Lebanon, seizing the opportunity to eradicate Hezbollah? The straightforward answer is that halting the war is unfeasible. Israel remains committed to the conflict, particularly after Hezbollah compelled over 70,000 Israelis to evacuate their homes in the Galilee.
While Sinwar remains alive, Nasrallah has sadly become another casualty, buried beneath the rubble of buildings that once sheltered him. Sinwar’s actions have irrevocably altered both Gaza and Lebanon simultaneously. It is necessary to acknowledge the impacts forged by a man who knew little beyond his years in an Israeli prison. Indeed, the responsibility for the Gaza war’s expansion into Lebanon does not rest solely with Sinwar. The foremost accountability lingers with Hezbollah and its directors in Tehran.
It must be conceded that Israel managed to deliver a significant blow to Hezbollah, which may struggle to recover. The issue extends beyond the assassinations of Nasrallah and his successor, Hashem Safieddine, to a broader wave of targeted killings of influential Hezbollah leaders tied closely to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that Israel has invested considerable efforts over more than 15 years to deliver this blow to Hezbollah and its strongholds in the southern suburbs, the south, the Beqaa, and other areas across Lebanon.
Sinwar, whose understanding of the world is limited, should have been better acquainted with Israel, having spent extensive years in its prisons. He ought to have foreseen the repercussions following the killing of around 1,200 Israelis in Gaza settlements and the capture of others. The same can be said for the late Nasrallah, who failed to recognize the gravity of linking Lebanon’s fate to the Gaza conflict – a transgression against the nation and its citizens.
A profound connection between Lebanon and Gaza is their shared affiliation with Iran. The Islamic Republic aimed to exploit the Gaza conflict to its fullest, waging proxy wars and maneuvering toward a deal with the American administration to cement Iran’s central role in the region and alleviate sanctions.
Despite recent developments, such as the release of $6 billion belonging to Iran from Qatari banks – a gesture of goodwill from the US toward new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian – the burning regional question remains: When will the inevitable clash between Israel and Iran unfold? This confrontation is unavoidable, as Israel’s reliance on Hamas and Hezbollah has dwindled.
The core concern for the Israelis is the looming threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon, a preoccupation that has intensified following October 7 and Hezbollah’s opening of the southern Lebanon front.
In conclusion, Sinwar is poised to dictate the trajectory of the region, influencing the futures of Gaza and Lebanon. Regrettably, the looming Israeli-Iranian confrontation will be a significant event to watch in the near future, with outcomes that remain uncertain. – Kheirallah Kheirallah
The path to peace
Al Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, October 10
Since the onset of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the conflict has traversed numerous military and political phases. Each phase has been marked by actions undertaken by Israel that contravene international law and for which accountability remains elusive.
A history of skirmishes has failed to culminate in any resolution that could deliver a just and comprehensive peace. Negotiations have repeatedly fallen short, presenting missed opportunities for peace. In the wait for peace, it is the innocent civilians who bear the brunt. Additionally, there are inconsequential conflicts lacking a clear identity or a direct connection to the Palestinian cause.
The peace process has become entangled in a maze of paths, all converging into dead ends. The Arab Peace Initiative, introduced by Saudi Arabia, was a formidable asset for the Palestinian side but was not fully leveraged in negotiations.
Why do talks continue to fall apart? Undoubtedly, one significant reason is Israel’s steadfastness, bolstered by the military and political backing it receives. Another factor is the absence of Palestinian unity.
However, there is a glimmer of hope for achieving peace and justice through peaceful means. This optimism manifests in the announcement by Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud regarding the formation of an international alliance to establish a Palestinian state and realize the two-state solution, borne out of a concerted European-Arab effort.
The inaugural meeting of this alliance is slated to take place in Riyadh. This development offers a promising prospect, particularly since the minister affirmed that the alliance aims to devise a practical strategy for achieving its envisioned objectives, ensuring a dependable and irreversible path to a just and comprehensive peace.
The minister, speaking on behalf of Arab and Islamic nations alongside European partners, emphasized that the establishment of an independent Palestinian state is not merely a distant negotiation outcome but an intrinsic right and a fundamental pillar of peace. He described the two-state solution as the most viable approach for breaking the cyclical conflict and suffering.
By pursuing peace, we can alleviate humanitarian catastrophes and halt conflicts characterized by conflicting goals that devolve into chaos, often exploited by parties with vested interests that undermine the Palestinian cause. Achieving peace requires justice, which represents the humane path to ending the cycle of killing, displacement, starvation, destruction, and rampant Israeli territorial expansion, as well as regional interferences that thrive on disorder for their own agendas.
Political solutions can indeed triumph, and rights can be reclaimed through peace. Wars have failed to achieve meaningful outcomes for those directly involved, serving only the interests of those who exploit the situation. For the innocents who once placed their hopes in passionate rhetoric, the realization has set in that they were misled by false victories that led to death, displacement, starvation, and deep psychological scars marked by frustration and despair.
Though the journey to peace is long and challenging, it is, at times, a more potent force than the path of warfare. – Youssef al-Qablan
Nasrallah’s successor
Al-Ahram, Egypt, October 10
It appears that the selection of the new secretary-general of Hezbollah, following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, will face a delay. This postponement is understandable within the context of what is expected to be an extraordinary situation. Several possible reasons for this delay come to mind, with three standing out prominently.
The foremost and most probable reason relates to security concerns. Revealing the identity of the new secretary-general could provide an opportunity for Israeli forces to target him. We’ve already witnessed attempts on the life of Hashem Safieddine, a leading candidate to succeed Nasrallah, even before any official announcement of his candidacy.
The second potential reason for the delay might be the lack of consensus on Nasrallah’s successor amid these challenging circumstances. The situation has been further complicated by the emergence of a new generation stepping into leadership roles following the deaths of previous leaders.
Although the party’s leadership hierarchy was established in more stable times, this structure has now been disrupted. It was never anticipated that the transition of leadership from Nasrallah would occur during such turbulent times, nor that it would coincide with the ascent of a new generation to significant political and military positions.
Some of these emerging leaders might hold a distinct vision for navigating the party’s role and future trajectory in this evolving landscape, a vision that diverges from previous strategies, especially after Hezbollah’s engagement in what began as a small-scale operation to support resistance efforts in the Gaza Strip and has since escalated beyond the initial conflict where it aimed to assist its allies in concrete ways, not merely in rhetoric.
However, the delay might not be due to these factors alone. The reorganization of field commanders who have fallen, particularly within the Radwan unit operating in southern Lebanon, may take precedence. This restructuring seems to have occurred swiftly and with decentralized authority, as illustrated by the rebranding of the Abu Talib and Abu Nimah groups, now known as Aziz and Nasr.
The effects of these changes are already manifesting in the field, marking a new phase in the ongoing confrontations against the occupation forces’ attempts to penetrate southern Lebanon. – Wahid Abdel-Meguid
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.
