Russia entered the war in Syria in 2015, siding with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The civil war had been going on for four years and involved various groups and political forces, supported by various international allies.
For the Kremlin, involvement in Syria had several important dimensions. Firstly, since the times of the USSR, Moscow has maintained friendly relations with the Syrian authorities and decided to seal this alliance by supporting Assad in a moment of crisis. Exactly in the same way as Putin rejected the Ukrainian authorities elected as a result of early elections after the Maidan in 2014, in Syria he did not want to allow the revolutionary collapse of the regime that he considered the only legal one that guaranteed the country’s stability. It doesn’t matter that Assad has managed to change from a progressive reformer into a bloody dictator.
The durability and stability of power structures are more important issues for the Kremlin than the will of the people, the desire for freedom, democracy and reforms. Ideologically, Russia’s choice of side in this war was most consistent. It was intensified by the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011, which reportedly made a stunning impression on Putin and unleashed new levels of solidarity with dictatorial regimes. But it wasn’t just about doing a favor for Assad and his family or believing in the advantages of dictatorship over democracy.
Syria was supposed to be a profitable investment for Russia
Russia considered participation in the war in Syria as an interesting and potentially profitable geopolitical challenge. After 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, sanctions were imposed on Russia, and Putin began to be treated with distrust and distance in the West. But several years of Western involvement in Syria have yielded no results. Russia entered this conflict to show its agency, expand its influence in the international arena, especially in the Middle East, and show everyone, primarily the United States, that complex global problems cannot be solved without its participation. That we simply have to talk to Russia, due to its military power and political influence, whether someone likes it or not.
From today’s perspective, from a military perspective, the Russian intervention in Syria can be seen as a dress rehearsal before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is difficult to say unequivocally whether anyone other than Putin had already set such a goal. The fact is, however, that the Russian military used Syria as a training ground, and Russian commanders were given the opportunity to climb the career ladder. Also there, in the Syrian war, the Wagner Group’s modus operandi was becoming clear. The effectiveness in protecting the interests of Russia and Assad in Syria meant that the services of Prigozhin’s mercenaries appeared in demand in many countries, mainly African ones, and the Wagner Group began to be accompanied by the myth of extremely efficient and well-trained troops. A myth that fell apart under Bachmut.
Already in 2016, the Kremlin announced success. Russia concluded an agreement with the US, supported by Türkiye and the Syrian regime. A province was established around Idlib, run by rebels supported by Ankara, but Bashar Assad maintained control over the rest of the country with the help of the Russian army and mercenaries. It cost the lives of thousands of civilians and almost razed Aleppo to the ground, which the regime’s troops helped repel Russian airstrikes. But the situation in the country calmed down and normalized over time. Russia appeared in glory and glory, and the world slowly forgot about the war in Syria, which was timidly reminded only by Syrian refugees scattered around the Middle East and desperately trying to get to Europe.
Russian bases in Syria. “Investments for the dog”
In exchange for its services, Russia received from Assad the right to use the military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim for 49 years. The Kremlin invested millions of dollars in them. According to the estimates of one of the Russian media, the cost of the Syrian “special operation” in its hot phase was approximately $2.5 million per day, but after the end of military operations, Russia continued to pour funds into these bridgeheads. Now Russian commentators have no illusions that the new Syrian authorities will not honor the lease agreement and are only wondering how to safely evacuate these bases so that their escape does not resemble the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. And no one has any doubts that it will depend primarily on the good will of the Turkish president.
Mikhail Khodarionok, a military commentator on the pro-Kremlin website Gazeta.ru, is most concerned about the bases: ‘Since 2015, huge amounts of money have been invested in the construction and equipment of these military facilities. Tartus was built practically from scratch. Hmeymim was also turned into a first-class air base. I saw it all with my own eyes. It makes me want to tear my hair out that everything that was created with so much work and resources will most likely have to be abandoned. In other words, we built, we created, we strengthened, and all in vain.” He is echoed in stronger words by the author of the analysis in Reportior magazine, Sergey Marzhitsky, who states: “Nine years of Moscow’s military support for official Damascus have gone to waste.”
“Previous claims that Moscow achieved a significant geopolitical victory in Syria, tested the combat effectiveness of its armed forces, tested new samples of weapons and military equipment, and created a springboard for expanding its geostrategic influence over the countries of the African continent, today sound, to put it mildly, outdated” – this also a quote from the above-mentioned Mikhail Khodarionek, although exactly the same could be said by any Russian oppositionist.
Even dictators cannot rely on Putin
It shows that Russia is not an ally you can rely on permanently. This is an important signal to various types of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes around the world. And more broadly – to all countries that the Kremlin wants to perceive as the leader of a new international that questions the Western political and economic order. The fall of Assad results from a combination of geopolitical situations – the weakening of Iran and Hezbollah by Israel, while at the same time weakening Russia, which withdrew a significant part of its forces from Syria to transfer them to Ukraine. And also the death of Prigozhin and the liquidation of the Wagner Group, which was a rock for Assad and his people. Gazeta.ru’s journalist describes this last factor euphemistically as… “a series of personnel and organizational decisions that led to the disbandment of one of the important Russian private military companies.”
But Russia largely worked alone for the coincidence that led to its Syrian disaster. Miscalculations regarding the war in Ukraine, which was supposed to last a few days rather than years, forced Putin to reduce his presence and involvement in Syria. In an ostentatious alliance with Iran and Hamas, Russia provoked Israel, and Prigozhin’s excessive fattening ended with the famous march on Moscow and an attempted military coup. As a result, Russia itself had to count on hardware support from its allies – in the form of Iranian drones and North Korean missiles, and even personnel, i.e. North Korean soldiers. Although Putin likes to pretend to be a representative of the Global South countries and an expressor of their needs and desires, he does not have much to offer his partners in this part of the world.
What is particularly painful for Russia is that it has been outplayed by its traditional “frenemy”, i.e. friend-enemy – Turkey. Erdogan, who supports the Syrian rebels from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, did not even hide his satisfaction, calling on Russian leaders for dialogue on the future of Syria. However, Türkiye is faking this dialogue only out of politeness, inviting representatives of Iran and Russia to talks, because it has already dealt all the cards itself.
Russia’s catastrophe in Syria. Propagandists are already looking for those responsible
The only thing that may be surprising in this situation is that there are still people in Russia who are surprised. The “experts” working for the propagandist Solovyov said that this was a stab in the back from Ankara. Yes, Türkiye has not taken a clear stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine, wanting to maintain its role as a mediator. It is true that Türkiye meets many of Russia’s import needs and helps circumvent Western sanctions. But at the same time, it sold the Bayraktars to Ukraine, trapped the Russian fleet in the Black Sea by closing the straits and cut it off from support, and gave Ukraine, contrary to the agreement with Russia, some of the defenders of Azovstal. And in 2015, shortly after Russia entered the war in Syria, Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24, claiming it had violated its airspace. Moreover, even after the Syria deal in 2016, Türkiye never pretended to support Assad. Russian complaints about a “bad ally” that was never an ally sound childish, to say the least.
If not Turkey, then the blame for its own failure can still be placed on Iran. This is also a thread from Soloviev’s program, in which the invited guests explained that the defense of Aleppo was Tehran’s zone of responsibility, which did not react in time to the insurgents’ offensive. But the most important thread is the so-called “Ukrainian trace”. And these are not the fantasies of Russian propagandists, but also foreign experts, including: Defence24 claims that Ukrainian military intelligence special forces were spotted in Idlib in June. And Kyiv Post maintains the version that Ukrainian specialists trained Syrian rebels in the combat use of drones. If this information is confirmed, it means that Ukraine, whose statehood and subjectivity Russia stubbornly does not recognize, is becoming an important international actor that plays globally not only in the sphere of diplomacy and is able to effectively attack Russian interests in various corners of the world.
The fall of Assad and Russia’s Syrian defeat also mean that the Kremlin is losing one of its few open allies. Damascus was one of the few countries that accepted not only the annexation of Crimea by Russia, but even recognized the Donbas pseudo-republics – Luhansk and Donetsk. Now Moscow won’t even have that. By losing Syria, it also loses its tools of influence and pressure in the Middle East. All this can be rationalized and Russian propaganda is slowly starting to rationalize the alliance – Syria was a failed state anyway, from the Russian point of view it was a bad investment that brought no economic benefits, now at least there will be peace and there will be no need to spend so much money on maintenance no one needs a regime. Although some headlines talk about the opening of a new front for Putin, the truth is that this front is closing. Russia is no longer needed for anything in Syria.
Putin’s serious problem with Syria
But in fact, Russia has another serious problem with Syria, which may affect its internal situation. When Putin decided to join the war on Assad’s side in 2015, he indicated the fight against Islamic terrorism as one of his goals. The Islamic State successfully recruited young Muslims from the Caucasus – Chechens and Dagestanis – into its ranks. The Kremlin began to fear that in this way the caliphate would expand its influence in the Russian North Caucasus. This will result in a new wave of terrorist attacks and even an armed escalation of the frozen political, ethnic and religious conflicts in the region. It was in Russia’s pragmatic interest to nip this threat in the bud rather than wait for it to come to Federation territory.
Meanwhile, after the fall of the Syrian regime, videos began to circulate online in which the insurgents were saying triumphant phrases in Russian – with a Caucasian accent – and greeting their Muslim brothers in the Caucasus. The Russian services have failed to effectively limit the participation of Russian citizens in the war against Assad. These videos, combined with the March attack at Krokus-City Hall in Moscow, signal that the threat of Islamic radicalism in Russia will only grow stronger, resurrecting old and generating new internal tensions.
The final conclusion that can be drawn from the fall of the Syrian regime for Russia, but also for us, is that freezing the conflict does not bring long-term stability. The war sooner or later returns in full force, bringing victory to one of the sides. This sad truth – recently confirmed also during the Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia – may have a significant impact on the peace process in Ukraine announced by Trump.
